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1. Introduction 
To sort out and assess effects of policy interventions beyond popular beliefs, it is necessary to apply 
models that can simulate behavioral responses. Although nonbehavioral models are useful for studying 
direct effects on income distributions resulting from policy changes (conditional on household 
behavior), their disadvantage is that they are unable to provide answers to most of the questions raised 
in the political debate, such as how a suggested tax reform will change labor supply, and who loses 
and who gains from the reform (Creedy et al., 2002). 
 Since Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) and Heckman (1974a and 1974b), empirical labor 
supply models have been embedded in a behavioral framework. One important extension of this line 
of research was made by Burtless and Hausman (1978), who proposed a method which explicitly 
accounted for piecewise linear and nonconvex budget sets. That paper and others by Hausman led to 
an outpouring of empirical research based on his approach; see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a 
survey of these studies, and also MaCurdy et al. (1990) and Heim and Meyer (2003). In this research 
and also in more recent work on labor supply, such as van Soest et al. (2002), it is assumed that the 
choice variable is hours of work, which can be chosen freely in the market. Wage rates are determined 
by human capital characteristics and, together with the chosen hours of work and the tax structure 
facing the agents, the disposable household incomes follow. In our opinion, an important weakness 
with this standard approach is the neglect of the possibility that nonpecuniary job attributes may 
matter a great deal to the agents’ labor market choices. In the conventional approach, it is simply 
assumed with no further discussion that disposable income and leisure are the only decision variables 
that affect preferences. 
 In contrast, the point of departure in this paper is that in addition to leisure and disposable 
income, “job type” is an important decision variable. Type of job and other nonpecuniary job 
attributes may matter a great deal for the chosen labor market affiliation of the individuals. Some jobs 
may be more interesting and challenging than other jobs and to explain the long working hours among 
scientists and government bureaucrats, for instance, solely with reference to after-tax wage rates may 
be quite misleading. In Dagsvik and Strøm (2006), as well as in previous contributions, cf. Aaberge, 
Dagsvik and Strøm (1995), Dagsvik and Strøm (1997), Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999), it is 
assumed that the agent faces a choice set of feasible jobs with job-specific (given) hours of work and 
job-specific wages. Thus, in this setup, realized hours of work are equal to job-specific hours of the 
chosen job. This seems to be consistent with labor markets throughout the industrialized world where 
it is typically found that hours of work are fixed for many types of jobs. This is due to firm 
technology, government regulations and/or the outcome of negotiations between unions and employers 
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associations in unionized economies. Thus, to change working load within this setup, one has to 
change jobs; see Altonji and Paxson (1988) for findings that support this view. Although most job 
attributes are unobserved (apart from the sector aspect), in our application this alternative point of 
departure has important implication for the econometric modeling framework, which differs radically 
from the conventional approach. Specifically, it implies a new way of interpreting and dealing with 
quantity constraints in the labor market. Typically, data on hours of work show at peaks full-time and 
part-time hours of work. Within our alternative approach, this is interpreted as resulting from 
institutional constraints in the labor market, implying that most jobs offer typical full-time or part-time 
hours of work. For a review of discrete choice approaches, see, for example, Creedy and Kalb (2005). 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore in detail some features of the alternative approach 
developed and estimated by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). The empirical labor supply model concerns 
married women only. The reason for this selection is that this group of individuals are found in many 
studies to be the most responsive ones, cf. Røed and Strøm (2002). Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) extend 
Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (1999) in that one important 
job attribute is observed, namely which sector the chosen job belongs to, either “public” or “private”. 
To this end, in this paper we have carried out a wide range of simulation experiments that demonstrate 
the degree of magnitude and heterogeneity in responses, and the results of these experiments are 
summarized below. Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) extend the previous work of this type in another aspect, 
namely by providing a theoretical justification of the functional form of the utility function. 
 To account for differences in socioeconomic characteristics is of great importance in the 
assessment of how changes in tax rules affect labor supply and household welfare; see Atkinson 
(1995). In our framework, as well as in other discrete choice approaches, observed as well as 
unobserved heterogeneity plays a more important role than in the standard approach owing to the fact 
that we allow for more general functional form specifications and more variety in the distribution of 
taste shifters because of the assumption that agents have preferences over nonpecuniary job attributes. 
However, in the two-sector model developed by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006), additional observed 
heterogeneity is accounted for through the choice of sector. Type of job and sector affiliations may 
matter for labor supply responses when tax systems are changed, as the more interesting and 
challenging a job is, the less important may be the net wage (above a certain level). Those who have 
these types of jobs are not randomly chosen in the population; they tend to be well educated, with high 
wage incomes, and their spouse may also fit the same characteristics. This kind of behavior may have 
strong implications for how tax rules should be changed to stimulate labor supply. Improved economic 
incentives should be targeted towards those who respond, not necessarily towards those with the 
highest education and income levels, who face the highest marginal tax rates. 
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 The sector dimension of the model allows us to go beyond overall labor supply responses to 
changes in wages and tax rates. Our hypothesis is that although overall labor supply may be rather 
inelastic, these modest labor supply responses may shadow for stronger responses with respect to 
sectoral choice. Highly educated women are often found working in the public sector in a welfare state 
such as Norway. Job security is higher than in the private sector, human capital seems to be priced 
slightly higher and the public sector may offer better opportunities to find subsidized childcare 
facilities. On the other hand, in the private sector, wages are more dispersed and hours are less 
regulated. We should thus expect that stronger incentives to work, like higher wages or lower marginal 
tax rates, may have an impact on the sectoral choice of working women. Higher wages, in particular in 
the private sector, or lower marginal tax rates, may give women an incentive to shift labor supply 
away from the public towards the private sector. A typical example is a part-time nurse or a medical 
doctor in a public hospital who shifts her labor supply to a private clinic with longer working hours. 
However, the income of the spouse may affect the choice of the wife and we should remember that 
matching in the marriage market is not random. Typically, a woman with a high potential wage in the 
market is married to a man with similar opportunities. 
 The results of the policy experiments are reported through different measures. First, we report 
labor supply responses, overall and across sectors. We also report labor supply responses according to 
deciles in the distribution of disposable household income. To compute, say, wage elasticities, 
conditional on disposable household income, we derive from the model the joint probability of sector 
choice, hours of work and disposable household income. From this joint probability, we derive the 
conditional probability of sector choice and hours of work, conditional on household income. The 
computation of wage elasticities, conditional on disposable income, is then straightforward. Second, to 
evaluate a policy intervention that consists in implementing a particular tax reform, we report 
compensating variation (CV) figures using the methodology of Dagsvik and Karlström (2005). In the 
1980s and early 1990s, many OECD countries reformed their tax systems. Progressive tax schedules 
were changed towards proportional taxation. Marginal tax rates were cut, in particular for high 
incomes. The Norwegian tax reform we analyze here was similar and took place in 1992. The top 
marginal tax rate on wage income was reduced from 0.654 to 0.495. Our analysis shows that such a 
sharp reduction in marginal tax rates stimulates overall labor supply to some extent, but it gives 
married women an incentive to move from the public sector to the private sector where hours are less 
constrained and wage dispersion is higher. Despite the fact that labor supply increases, which enlarges 
the tax base, tax revenues are reduced. Thus, the view held by some politicians that government 
revenue can be increased by cutting tax rates does not to seem to hold even in the highly tax-
progressive Scandinavian welfare states. An important aspect of the paper is the calculation of the 
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mean value of the change in household welfare (CV) that follows from the tax reform. We find that 
the rich gained far more than did the poor from the 1992 tax reform. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is explained briefly. Data are 
described in Section 5 and the empirical specification and estimation results follow in the next section. 
Labor supply elasticities are reported and interpreted in Section 7. In Section 8, we estimate the model 
under the restriction that the distribution of hours of work among the feasible jobs is uniform. In 
Sections 9 and 10, the implications of two tax reforms are analyzed. 
2. The one-sector model 
In what follows, we give a simplified description of the model. For more details and for justifications 
of the assumption made, we refer the reader to Dagsvik and Strøm (2004, 2006). The present paper is 
about the labor supply of married and cohabiting women. The labor supply and hence the wage 
income of the husband is exogenously given. For expository reasons, we begin by assuming that the 
agent can choose between jobs in one sector versus not working. Later, we will show how the model 
can be extended to deal with choice of jobs in different sectors of the economy. 
 The household is assumed to derive utility from household consumption, here set equal to 
household disposable income, leisure and nonpecuniary attributes of jobs. Let ( ), ,U C h z  be the utility 
function of a household, where C is disposable household income, h is hours of work of the married 
woman, z indexes jobs ( 1,2,3,...z = ) and 0=z  represents not working. The reason why the index z 
enters the utility function is that job-specific attributes beyond wage and hours of work may affect the 
utility of the agents. Examples of such attributes are type of work, stimulating colleagues, location of 
the work place and subsidized kindergarten. In principle, some of these job-specific attributes can be 
observed, but it is obvious that the researcher cannot observe many of them, and that many cannot be 
represented quantitatively. The assessments of these unobserved job-specific attributes may vary 
across agents. Thus, as an outside observer, the researcher has to assume that the utility function is 
random. 
 For given hours of work h and wage rate w, disposable household income is given by 
(1) ( ),C f hw I= , 
where f(·) is a function that transforms pretax incomes into after-tax incomes. The pretax incomes are 
the wage income of the married female (hw) and three nonlabor income components included in the 
vector I. These three incomes are the wage income of the husband, the capital income of the household 
and child allowances, which vary with the number of children up to the age of 18. Child allowances 
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are not taxed. All details of the tax structure are taken into account in the estimation of the model. The 
tax functions of wage income in 1994, as well as child allowances, are given in Appendix B. From 
there, we note that the tax functions differ depending on whether both spouses are working. Capital 
income is taxed at a flat rate of 0.28. The utility function has the structure 
(2) ( ) ( ), , , ( )U C h z v C h zε= , 
for 0,1,2,3,...z = , where v(·) is a positive deterministic function and ε(z) is a positive random taste 
shifter. The taste shifter accounts for unobserved individual characteristics and unobserved job-
specific attributes. These taste shifters { }( )zε , are assumed to be i.i.d. across jobs and agents, with 
c.d.f. ( )1exp , 0− >x x . To the outside observer, the agent’s choice set of feasible jobs is not known and 
it may differ from the choice sets of other agents. To represent such unobserved heterogeneity in 
opportunities, it is desirable to apply a framework that allows for a convenient representation of 
stochastic choice sets. Such a representation is discussed in Dagsvik and Strøm (2004, 2006). Here, in 
this section, and for expository reasons only, we describe the model when choice sets vary solely by 
observable characteristics. 
 Assume that the agent faces a fixed (individual-specific) wage rate in the labor market and let 
B(h) denote the agent’s sets of available jobs with offered hours of work h. Let m(h) be the number of 
jobs in the choice set B(h). Although m(h) may also depend on the wage rate, we suppress this in the 
notation here. The nonmarket choice consists of one alternative so that { }(0) 0B =  and (0) 1=m . Let 
D be the set of feasible annual hours. To simplify exposition let 
(3) ( ) ( )( ), , , ,h W I v f hW I hψ = . 
For the sake of interpretation and empirical specification, it will be convenient to express m(h) as 
follows. Let 
0
( )
h
m hθ
>
=∑  and ( ) ( )g h m h θ= , which yields ( ) ( )m h g hθ= . Note that θ is the total 
number of jobs available to the woman in the market, whereas g(h) is the fraction of feasible jobs (for 
the woman) with h hours of work. 
 The assumptions made above allow us to derive the probability that an agent will choose a job 
with hours of work h within the choice set B(h). By well-known results, it follows that if the agent is a 
utility maximizer, then the probability that job z within the choice set B(h) is chosen, is given by 
(4)  ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
, , , ,
, , ( ) max max , , ( )
, , ( ) , ,x k D x
x D k B x x D
h W I h W I
P h W I z x W I k
x W I m x x W I
ψ ψψ ε ψ ε
ψ ψ∈
∈ ∈ ∈
 = = =  ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
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Let ( ); ,h W Iϕ  denote the probability of choosing any job within the choice set B(h), and let H denote 
the hours of work of the chosen job. Obviously, ( ); ,h W Iϕ  must be equal to the sum of the 
probabilities of choosing a specific job in the choice set B(h), summed over all jobs in this choice set. 
Then, from (3) and (4), we get 
(5) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
0,
0,
; , , , , ( ) max max , , ( )
, , ( ) , ,
( ) , , 0,0, ( ) , ,
( ) , ,
.
0,0, ( ) , ,
x k B x
z B h
z B h
x D x x D
x x D
h W I P H h W I P h W I z x W I k
h W I m h h W I
m x x W I I m x x W I
g h h W I
I g x x W I
∈
∈
∈
∈ > ∈
> ∈
 = = = = 
= =
+
=
+
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
ϕ ψ ε ψ ε
ψ ψ
ψ ψ ψ
θ ψ
ψ θ ψ
 
Note that the choice probability of not working, ( )0, ;W Iϕ , follows from (5) by replacing the 
numerator with (0,0, )Iψ . Note also that we have used that ( ) ( )0, , 0,0,=W I Iψ ψ . We note that the 
numerator in the choice probability in (5) can be interpreted as the representative value of jobs with 
hours of work h (the ψ(·) term), weighted by the number of feasible jobs in the market with the 
respective characteristics (the m(·) term). The denominator represents the corresponding sum of 
weighted values of the representative indirect utility, including the option of not working. 
 It should be emphasized that the weighting of utilities in the choice probabilities by the 
respective number of feasible jobs is justified with a reference to how the labor market is organized 
and regulated. A change in these institutional constraints in the labor market will change the labor 
supply probabilities. These eventual changes are driven by changes in demand-side factors (firm 
technology) and/or labor market institutions (government regulation or outcomes about working hours 
in the negotiations between unions and employers’ associations) and not by changes in preferences. 
This setup should be contrasted with the ad hoc approach of van Soest (1994) and Callan and van 
Soest (1996), who include a penalty rate for particular hours in the utility function so that the 
probabilities at these points are reduced; see Creedy and Kalb (2005) for a review of these and related 
approaches. In the approach of van Soest (1994), a change in a labor market institution or firm 
technology that changes the constraints on hours offered in the market will falsely be attributed to 
changes in preferences. 
 In the modeling framework discussed above, it is assumed that the wage rates are specific to 
each individual. This differs from the setup in Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995) and Aaberge, 
Colombino and Strøm (1999) where the wage rates are allowed to vary across jobs. The problem with 
the approach with job-specific wage rates is that it is difficult to separate variations in the wage rates 
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across jobs for a given individual from variation in the wage rates across individuals. For example, in 
the works referred to above, identification is facilitated by the restriction that random effects are ruled 
out. This is unreasonable as it is reasonable to believe that, within a group of individuals of a given 
age and educational level, the variation in wage rate levels across individuals is substantially greater 
than variation in wage rate opportunities across jobs, for a given person. This motivates the approach 
taken in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006), where the emphasis is on variation in wage rates across 
individuals due to unobservables (random effects). 
3. Unobserved heterogeneity in choice sets 
In the modeling setup above, the choice sets of feasible jobs were assumed to be equal across 
observationally identical individuals. This is clearly unsatisfactory as it is highly likely that choice sets 
vary according to unobserved individual characteristics. Thus, it would be desirable to extend the 
modeling framework to allow for stochastic choice sets. This issue has been discussed in Dagsvik 
(1994) and in the context of labor supply modeling in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). Dagsvik and Strøm 
(2006) discuss how a continuous “weighted multinomial logit” version of (5) is consistent with an 
interpretation with random choice sets. However, the discrete version discussed above is also 
consistent with stochastic choice sets. (By letting the c.d.f. G be a discrete distribution, the desired 
result follows from Theorem 7 in Dagsvik (1994).) To clarify and interpret the formalism of Dagsvik 
(1994), we outline the key concepts below. 
 To this end, let H(z) denote the (fixed) hours of work associated with job z with taste shifters 
( )zε . Recall that the taste shifters’ ( )zε  represents the utility value of the nonpecuniary unobservable 
attributes of job z, that is ( )*( ) ( )z T zε ε= , where *( )ε ⋅  is a suitable deterministic function and T(z) is 
a vector of unobserved qualitative attributes of job z. Let ( ){ }( ), ( ) , 1,2,...H z T z z =  be the set of 
feasible offered hours and qualitative attributes. A key assumption is that ( )( ), ( ) , 1,2,...H z T z z = , are 
independently and randomly scattered in some suitable set Ω . In addition, )(zH and )(zT are 
independent. A formal representation of such “spatial” stochastic processes is the bivariate Poisson 
process, with components H(z) and T(z) that are independent. If the Poisson process is homogeneous, 
the points are randomly but evenly distributed on Ω . If the Poisson process is nonhomogeneous, the 
points are unevenly distributed in the sense that it is likely that the concentration of points in some 
parts of Ω  is higher than in other parts. It follows that the transformed process with points 
( ){ }( ), ( ) , 1,2,...H z z zε =  is also a Poisson process. The concentration of points in a Poisson process 
can be represented by the so-called intensity measure, which in this case equals 2( )dG h dθ ε ε⋅ , for 
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0ε > , 0h > , where ( )G ⋅  is a c.d.f. function and 0θ >  is a constant. The interpretation of the 
intensity measure is that 2( )dG h dθ ε ε⋅  is the probability that a job with ( )( ) ,H z h h dh∈ + , 
( )( ) ,z dε ε ε ε∈ +  is feasible to the agent. If ( )G h  is a step function, it follows that ( )dG h  is zero, 
except at points where ( )G h  “jumps”. The number of points in the Poisson process with this particular 
intensity measure, with ( )G h  being a step function with a finite number of steps, can be shown to be 
infinite (but countable). However, there will only be a finite number of points (jobs) with different 
hours of work, corresponding to the hours in D. Let ( ) ( )g h dG h= . Then, ( )g h  will be zero if h D∉  
and positive otherwise. As demonstrated in Dagsvik (1994), the choice probability density of H is 
given by (5). Note that the c.d.f. G in the intensity measure can be a completely general step function, 
whereas the particular functional form of the other factor, 2dε ε , is necessary for obtaining the 
weighted multinomial logit structure. In the case where G is absolutely continuous and thus 
differentiable, the corresponding choice model will be a continuous probability density, as discussed 
in Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). 
4. The two-sector model 
The two-sector model is similar to the model for one sector. The utility function is assumed to have 
the form ( ) ( ), , , , ( )= j jU C h j z v C h zµ ε , where 1,2=j  indexes the sectors and µj represents the 
average taste for working in sector j. The agent is assumed to face two wage rates, W1 and W2, specific 
to each sector. Not working is indexed by 0=j , in which case 0=z . Let ( )1 2,W W W= . Availability 
of jobs in the two sectors is allowed to vary across the two sectors and also across the human capital 
characteristics of the agents. For many reasons, most women are working in the service branch of the 
economy. In Norway, most of the services are provided by the public sector (health services, education 
etc) and many of these jobs require higher education, whereas the services provided in the private 
sector, say in retail sales, are typically based on low-skilled labor. Hence, it makes sense to assume 
that the availability of jobs in the two sectors depends on education level. 
 Let ( ); ,j h W Iϕ  be the probability of choosing sector j and hours of work h. Similarly to (5), it 
follows that 
(6) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )2
1 0,
, , ( )
; ,
0,0, , , ( )
j j j j
j
k k k k
k x x D
h W I g h
h W I
I x W I g x
ψ θ µ
ϕ
ψ ψ θ µ
= > ∈
=
+∑ ∑
, 
for 0,>h  1,2=j , and 
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(7) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 2
1 0,
0,0,
0; ,
0,0, , , ( )k k k k
k x x D
I
W I
I x W I g x
ψϕ
ψ ψ θ µ
= > ∈
=
+∑ ∑
, 
for 0=h . Here ( ), 1,2,=jg h j  denotes the opportunity density of offered hours in sector j. The 
densities of offered hours are assumed to be uniform, apart from peaks at typical full-time and part-
time hours. This accounts for the fact that there are more jobs available in the labor market with part-
time hours and full-time hours. This assumption means that when we observe many people working, 
say full time, rushing to their job at 7 a.m. and rushing back home at 5 p.m., this may reflect 
constraints on offered hours in the market rather than individuals preferring to have the exact same 
working load. In a perfect competitive economy with no constraints on offered hours, offered hours 
are uniformly distributed and hence gj(h) is a constant. Similarly to the one-sector model, the terms 
, 1,2,=j jθ  represent the availability of jobs in sector j. Note that the preference parameter µj cannot 
be separated from θj without additional assumptions. To achieve identification, we have therefore set 
1jµ = . Below, we will assume that there are more jobs available for the higher educated in the public 
sector than in the private. 
5. Data 
Data on the labor supply of married women in Norway used in this study consist of a merged sample 
of the “Survey of Income and Wealth, 1994” and the “Level of living conditions, 1995” (Statistics 
Norway, 1994 and 1995, respectively). Data cover married couples as well as cohabiting couples with 
common children. The ages of the spouses range from 25 to 64. None of the spouses is self-employed 
and none of them is on disability or other type of benefits. A person is classified as a wageworker if 
their income from wage work is higher than their income from self-employment. All taxes paid are 
observed and in the assessment of disposable income, at hours not observed, all details of the tax 
system are accounted for. Hours of work are calculated as the sum of hours of the main job as well as 
those of any side jobs. In 1994, the unemployment rate in Norway was rather low by international 
standards. For that reason, the fact that we employ actual hours worked instead of desired hours 
(which were unavailable) is unlikely to be of significance. 
 Wage rates above NOK 350 or below NOK 401 are not utilized when estimating the wage 
equations. The wage rates are computed as the ratio of annual wage income to hours worked. When 
computing annual wage income, we take into account the fact that some women have multiple jobs. 
                                                     
1
 In June 2006, 1 USD≈NOK 6.20 
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The size of the sample used in estimating the labor supply model is 810. Descriptions of variables and 
summary statistics are given in Appendix A and the tax function and child allowances are given in 
Appendix B. 
6. Empirical specification and estimation results 
The choice set of offered hours is assumed to be represented by seven intervals. The medians of the 
intervals range from 315 annual hours to 2600 annual hours and are given by 
{ }0, 315, 780,1040,1560,1976, 2340, 2600=D . The midpoints in the intervals for part-time and full-
time jobs are 1040 and 1976 annual hours, respectively. 
 Wage rates are assumed to depend on human capital characteristics such as potential work 
experience and education. Both the levels of and the returns to human capital are allowed to vary 
between the public and the private sectors. When estimating the model given in (6) and (7), we face 
two problems. First, sector j wage rates are observed only for those who work in sector j. Second, 
wage rates may be endogenous in the sense that they may be correlated with the taste shifters. To deal 
with these issues, sector-specific wage equations are estimated and used as instrument variables. In the 
wage equations, log wage rates are specified as a linear function of experience (defined as age minus 
years of education and minus six), experience squared and education level. The random error terms are 
assumed to be independent across sectors and normally distributed. To control for selectivity, wage 
equations are estimated separately in a two-step procedure; see Dagsvik and Strøm (2004). 
Subsequently, the sector-specific wage rates in the model are replaced by the respective estimated 
wage equations, including the error term. As the wage equations contain these random error terms, we 
must take the expectation of the choice probabilities (6) and (7) with respect to these error terms. We 
refer the reader to Dagsvik and Strøm (2004) for further details. 
 The estimates of the parameters of the wage equations obtained by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) 
are given in Appendix C. From the results given there, we observe that the wage level, given the 
observed covariates, is predicted to be slightly higher in the private sector than in the public sector. On 
the other hand, human capital variables like experience and education are priced marginally higher in 
the public sector compared to the private sector. From the estimates given in Appendix C, we observe 
that the standard deviation of the error term in the public sector, σ1, is estimated to be 0.243, whereas 
in the private sector the corresponding standard deviation σ2 is estimated to be 0.274. Thus, the wage 
level, as well as the dispersion in wages, is slightly higher in the private sector than in the public 
sector, whereas observed human capital is priced higher out on the margin in the public sector. 
13 
 Next, consider the structure of θj. As discussed in Section 2, in general this term will depend on 
the distribution of preferences of the workers and profit (cost) function of the firms through 
equilibrium conditions. To this end, Dagsvik (2000) discusses equilibrium issues in matching markets 
with heterogeneous suppliers and demanders. In fact, he demonstrates that labor supply models of the 
type considered in this paper are special cases within the framework in Dagsvik (2000, see section 
6.2). There, he shows that one can express the opportunity density θjgj(h) as the product of the number 
of vacancies in sector j times the conditional profit (cost) function, conditional on hours of work. This 
implies that the sector-specific vacancy levels are sufficient statistics for the equilibrium conditions in 
the sense that if the vacancy levels are observed, then θjgj(h) divided by the number of vacancies in 
sector j will depend only on the systematic part of the conditional profit functions of the firms. This 
property of the model could be utilized to identify and estimate structural specifications of the 
conditional profit functions, which would, apart from the vacancy levels, imply a structural 
specification of the opportunity densities. It is, however, far beyond the scope of our paper to identify 
and estimate a structural specification of the conditional profit functions of the firms. Therefore, we 
choose a reduced form specification, namely 
(8) 1 2log ,j j jf f Sθ = +  
for 1,2j = , where S is the length of education. 
 The functional form of the deterministic part of the utility function is a critical issue in structural 
empirical analysis. In most studies, a class of functional form is selected in a purely ad hoc manner. 
Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) postulated a particular invariance axiom that the model should satisfy and 
demonstrated that this implies that the deterministic term of the utility function has a Box–Cox type of 
functional, as given in Appendix C. For the reader’s convenience, we also report the estimates 
obtained by Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) in Appendix C. The estimated coefficients imply that the 
deterministic part of the utility function is quasi-concave. The interaction term between consumption 
and leisure is negative and significantly different from zero, which means that separability between 
consumption and leisure is rejected. Marginal utilities with respect to consumption and leisure are 
positive. The marginal utility of leisure declines with age to around 32 years of age and thereafter it 
increases with age. The number of young and “old” children has a similar and positive effect on the 
marginal utility of leisure. Thus, when the woman is young and has children, she has a reduced 
incentive to take part in work outside the home and when the children have grown up, her incentive to 
participate in the labor market again weakens because she is becoming older. 
 We would expect that offered hours in the public sector are more concentrated at full-time hours 
than in the private sector. The unions are stronger with a much higher coverage in the public than in 
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the private sector. We would also expect that there are more jobs available for the higher educated 
woman in the public sector than in the private sector. These expectations are confirmed by the 
estimates given in Appendix C. The estimated model fits the data quite well; see Dagsvik and Strøm 
(2006). The model predicts that 8.3 per cent of married women are not working. The predicted split 
between the public and the private sector is almost equal, with slightly more married women working 
in the public sector than in the private sector. Hours worked, conditional on working, are predicted to 
be almost the same across sectors, with a few more hours predicted for the private sector than for the 
public. Moreover, we show that in our empirical application, this class of functional form is fairly 
flexible, as compared to the class of third- to fifth-order polynomials in consumption and leisure; see 
van Soest et al. (2002). For more details regarding estimates and predictions, and comparisons with 
other model specifications, we refer the reader to Dagsvik and Strøm (2004, 2006). 
 Table 1 reports how the predicted choice probabilities vary with socioeconomic characteristics. 
The probability of not working decreases with age and education, and sharply increases with the 
number of children. The older the woman and the lower is her level of education, the more likely it is 
that she works in the private sector. 
 The probability of working in the public sector is remarkably similar across varying numbers of 
children. In contrast, the probability of working in the private sector declines rather strongly with the 
number of children. These findings accord well with widely held conjectures that childcare facilities 
and leave with pay at the time of giving birth are more easily available in the public sector than in the 
private. The predictions in Table 1 also accord with the “observation” that for highly educated women, 
who tend to be married to educated and well-paid men, there are more interesting and challenging jobs 
in the public than in the private sector. We observe that participation in the public sector increases 
rather sharply with the years of education of the woman. 
 Table 2 provides predictions of the conditional expectations of hours and their variation with 
socioeconomic characteristics. Expected hours, given working, are predicted to vary little across ages. 
They drop sharply in both sectors when the household has two or more children. Of particular interest 
is the prediction of how hours vary with education in the two sectors. In the public sector, hours 
increase slightly with years of education, whereas in the private sector, the highly educated woman is 
predicted to work rather long hours. As mentioned above, highly educated women tend to prefer the 
public rather than the private sector, but those who do work in the private sector work long hours. 
Although our estimates indicate that human capital is priced higher out at the margin in the public 
sector, we should keep in mind that hours are less regulated in the private sector and wage dispersion 
is higher. Examples of well-paid women working long hours in the private sector are women in 
leading management positions and female doctors working in private clinics rather than in public 
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hospitals. The question is whether improvements in job opportunities like higher wages, lower taxes 
and less regulated hours will move more women with high education from the public sector to the 
private sector. These are some of the issues that we discuss in the next sections. 
 
Table 1. Choice probabilities and their variation with socioeconomic variables for married 
women, Norway, 1994. Per cent 
Variables Not working Public sector Private sector 
Age range: 
25–34 10.45 47.32 42.33 
35–44   7.75 49.05 43.20 
43–64   6.80 44.71 48.49 
Number of children: 
0   4.89 46.02 49.09 
1   6.18 48.88 44.94 
2 10.09 46.76 43.15 
More than 2 16.79 47.03 36.18 
Education: 
Less than 9 years   9.71 27.54 62.74 
Intermediate   9.05 43.42 47.52 
High, 15–17 years   4.42 73.27 22.31 
 
Table 2. Conditional expectations of annual hours and their variation with socioeconomic 
variables for married women, Norway, 1994 
Variables Public sector Private sector 
Age range: 
25–34 1530 1576 
35–44 1571 1631 
43–64 1598 1608 
Number of children: 
0 1689 1694 
1 1627 1662 
2 1490 1530 
More than 2 1310 1363 
Education: 
Less than 9 years 1535 1531 
Intermediate 1552 1604 
High, 15–17 years 1607 1768 
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7. Elasticities 
This section contains simulation results that throw light on the properties of the model. All simulations 
are based on analytic expressions of the respective choice variables such as “hours of work”, 
“disposable income”, “choice of sector”, and “working versus not working”. Above we obtained an 
expression for the probability for the choice of sector, hours of work and not working. We shall now 
consider the derivation of the joint probability of sector choice, hours of work and disposable income 
(consumption). This simultaneous choice probability is needed for computing the conditional 
elasticities such as wage elasticity of labor supply, given the level of consumption. 
 Let 
 ( ) ( ), ; , ,j h y I P H h J j C y Iϕ = = = ≤ . 
It is implicit in the above definition that we condition on the explanatory variable in the wage 
equations. The error terms in the wage equations will be integrated out. From (1), it then follows that 
(9) 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ){ }
, ; , , ,
, , , ; , ,
j j
W j j
h y I P f hW I y H h J j I
E P f hW I y H h J j W I h W I
ϕ
ϕ
= ≤ = =
= ≤ = =

 
where EW denotes the expectation with respect to W, where W is the vector of sector wage rates. Note 
that when ( ), ,H J W  are given, then ( ),jf hW I  is nonstochastic and the probability 
 ( )( ), , , ,jP f hW I y H h J j W I≤ = =  
is equal to zero or one. Let 
 ( ) ( )1 if ,, ,
0 otherwise.
f x I y
x I yκ
 ≤
= 
 
Then, we can express (9) as 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, , , , ; ,j W j jh y I E hW I y h W Iϕ κ ϕ=  
for 1,2j = . Similarly, 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( )0 00, , 0, , 0; ,Wy I I y E W Iϕ κ ϕ= . 
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In practice, the probability in (10) is computed by stochastic simulation as follows. Let rjW  be given 
by the wage equation of sector j as 
(12) log r rj j j jW X β σ η= +  
where , 1,2,..., ,rj r Mη =  are independent draws from ( )0,1N . If M is large 
(13) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
, , , , ; ,
M
r r
j j j
r
h y I hW I y h W I
M
ϕ κ ϕ
=
≅ ∑  
where ( )1 2,r r rW W W= . Once we have obtained ( ), ,j h y Iϕ  it follows immediately that 
(14)   ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2 1
1 2
2 1 0 2 0 1
0 0,
, , , ,
, ,
, , , , 0, , 0, ,
j j
k k
k x x D
h y I h y I
P H h J j y C y I
x y I x y I y I y I
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
> > ∈
−
= = < ≤ =
− + −∑ ∑
 
    . 
Eq. (14) expresses the conditional density of chosen hours and sector, given that disposable income 
lies within the interval ( )1 2,y y . From this expression, we can compute the corresponding conditional 
mean hours of work and different types of conditional elasticities, such as the conditional elasticity of 
mean hours, given that consumption lies within some interval. On the basis of (13), we can also 
simulate the marginal distribution of consumption, as this distribution is given by 
(15) ( ) ( )2 0
1 0,
( , ) , , 0, ,k
k x x D
y I x y I y Iϕ ϕ ϕ
= > ∈
≡ +∑ ∑  . 
From (15), we can derive the decile limits. To this end, let N be the number of households and let 
(16) ( )
1
1( ) ,
N
i
i
i
y y I
N
ϕ
=
Φ = ∑  . 
Define yn, by ( ) 0.ny nΦ = for 1n =  and 9. Thus, if disposable income of household i, Ci, is equal to 
or below y1, it belongs to the first decile, whereas if 1 1 9y C y< ≤ , the disposable income belongs to the 
second to ninth deciles in the distribution of disposable income. If 1 9C y> , the disposable income 
belongs to the tenth decile. Below, we use these decile limits when we report the wage elasticities for 
households with income in the first, second to ninth and the tenth deciles. From (14) to (16), we 
observe that the denominator in (14) equals 0.1N, 0.8N and 0.1N for the first, second to ninth and the 
tenth deciles, respectively. 
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 In Tables 3–5, we report wage elasticities in labor supply among married women when the 
hourly wage rates are increased. The choice probabilities are used to calculate these elasticities. We 
have used stochastic simulation to calculate the expectation of the choice probabilities with respect to 
the error terms in the wage equations. The marginal effects are calculated for each individual and 
thereafter aggregated, and subsequently the corresponding elasticities are calculated. We term them 
aggregate elasticities. They measure the elasticities of aggregate labor supply (participation, expected 
hours worked) with respect to the wage rates. 
An overall wage increase and overall labor supply 
The first column of Table 3 defines the categories for which the elasticities are calculated. We have 
calculated the aggregated elasticities for the whole sample and according to deciles in the distribution 
of disposable income. The second column gives the elasticities of the probabilities of working, 
working in the public sector and working in the private sector. For simplicity, we term these 
elasticities the working sector elasticities. The next column gives the elasticities of hours of work, 
given that the individual works either in the public sector or in the private sector. The last column 
gives the elasticities of the unconditional expectation of labor supply with respect to wage rate 
changes.2 
 The sector dimension introduced here plays a novel role in how increased wage rates may affect 
behavior. In the public sector, human capital variables are priced marginally higher than in the private 
sector which makes the public sector more attractive for women with a higher education. On the other 
hand, hours are more regulated and the level of wage rates is lower and wage dispersion is less than in 
the private sector. The prospect of a wage increase may thus give the woman working in the public 
sector an incentive to move to the private sector. A typical example is a nurse or a medical doctor 
working in a public hospital who starts working in a private clinic because it offers higher wages. 
 From Table 3, we first observe that the probability of participation in the labor market is low in 
the first decile in the household income distribution, whereas in the upper deciles, participation is 
rather high, most likely the highest in the world. We also observe that hours supplied increase with the 
deciles in the household income distribution. 
 When turning to the simulated elasticities in Table 3, we note that an overall wage increase 
implies an elasticity with respect to working (in any sector) of 0.14. The elasticity of hours supplied, 
conditional on working, is slightly higher, 0.19, which means that the aggregate elasticity of labor 
supply in the population of married females in Norway in 1994 sums up to around 0.34. 
                                                     
2
 The last column is approximately equal to the sum of the preceding columns. The equality is not exact due to aggregation. 
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 The next lines in Table 3 give the same elasticities according to the deciles in the distribution of 
disposable household income. Women in the lower deciles in the distribution of disposable household 
income tend to be less responsive to wage increases than women belonging to higher deciles. 
Elasticities of participation are nearly the same across the deciles, whereas the elasticities of expected 
hours, conditional on working, increase with the deciles in the household income distribution. 
An overall wage increase and sectoral responses 
Turning now to the choice of sector and the sector-specific supply of hours, we observe that, in the 
public sector, the wage elasticities related to participation are declining with the deciles in the 
distribution of disposable household income. The negative sign of the elasticities of the public sector 
choice probability with respect to an overall wage increase for women in the upper deciles in the wage 
rate distribution (–0.18) indicates that women earning the highest wage rate may have some incentive 
to shift from working in the public sector to working in the private sector. The “high” elasticity of 
private sector choice probability (0.40) in the upper deciles supports this hypothesis. 
 In the private sector, we observe that the elasticity of the choice probability is increasing with 
the deciles in the disposable household income distribution. As mentioned above, education and 
experience is priced marginally higher in the public than in the private sector, which means that 
women with higher education and more experience should be expected to favor the public sector over 
the private. However, as demonstrated above, wage rate levels and the dispersion of wage rates, 
captured by the variance in the distribution of the random variables that affect wage rates, are higher in 
the private than in the public sector. Moreover, offered hours tend to be less spiked at full-time hours 
in the private sector than in the public. All of these factors are accounted for in the model. A higher 
chance of finding jobs with longer working hours and higher wage levels may be the reason why 
women with the highest wage rate would like to shift their labor supply from the public to the private 
sector, and to find jobs with longer working hours, when there is an overall increase in wage rates. The 
elasticity of expected hours, conditional on working, is slightly higher in the public than in the private 
sector. 
 We also report the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to an overall increase in wage rates. Tax 
revenues are increased for two reasons. A higher wage rate yields higher earnings, given labor supply. 
A higher wage rate stimulates labor supply. We observe that the elasticity is estimated to be 0.69, 
which is clearly less than 1. 
A wage increase in the public sector only 
In Table 4, we report the wage elasticities when only the wage rate in the public sector is increased. 
Comparing Tables 3 and 4, we observe that the effects on overall labor supply are considerably 
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weaker when the wage rates in the public sector only are increased. The most important result is that 
the modest wage elasticities related to work in any sector (overall labor supply) shadow for much 
higher intersector wage elasticities. An increase in wage rates in the public sector gives women an 
incentive to move from the private to the public sector. Hours of work, given the sector, are only 
modestly affected. 
A wage increase in the private sector only 
The same pattern emerges when the wage rates in the private sector only are increased, as shown in 
Table 5. The wage elasticities related to participation in the public sector decline with the deciles in 
the distribution of disposable household income, whereas the opposite occurs in the private sector. We 
note that women in the higher deciles in the household income distribution have a strong incentive to 
shift jobs from the public to the private sector as a response to a wage increase in the private sector. 
 
Table 3. Aggregate elasticities of labor supply with respect to an overall wage increase in the 
public and the private sector. Married Norwegian females, 1994 
 Mean working  
sector 
Mean conditional  
expected hours 
Mean unconditional  
expected hours 
 
 Probability  
per cent Elasticities Hours  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities 
All (Private and Public)  0.14 1559 0.19 1455 0.34 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
 
     
1 56.8 0.16 911 0.07 517 0.23 
2–9 95.5 0.14 1600 0.19 1527 0.32 
10 96.5 0.16 1877 0.28 1812 0.44 
Public 91.7 0.06 1551 0.23 737 0.28 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
   
   
1 33.7 0.25 931 0.14 314 0.39 
2–9 49.5 0.07 1596 0.22 790 0.29 
10 40.4 –0.18 1812 0.30 733 0.11 
Private 44.7 0.22 1563 0.15 718 0.39 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
 
     
1 23.1 0.03 882 –0.04 203 –0.01 
2–9 46.0 0.21 1604 0.15 737 0.36 
10 56.1 0.40 1923 0.26 1079 0.67 
Total tax revenue  
   
 0.69 
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Table 4. Aggregate elasticities of labor supply with respect to a wage increase in the public 
sector. Married Norwegian females, 1994 
 Mean working  
sector 
Mean conditional  
expected hours 
Mean unconditional  
expected hours 
 
 Probability  
per cent Elasticities Hours  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities 
All (Private and Public) 91.7 0.08 1559 0.12 1455 0.20 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
 
     
1 56.8 0.11 911 0.04 517 0.15 
2–9 95.5 0.08 1600 0.13 1527 0.21 
10 96.5 0.08 1877 0.08 1812 0.16 
Public 47.0 1.46 1551 0.22 737 1.76 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
   
   
1 33.7 0.31 931 0.11 314 0.42 
2–9 49.5 1.41 1596 0.22 790 1.65 
10 40.4 2.93 1812 0.27 733 3.28 
Private 44.7 –1.37 1563 0.00 718 –1.40 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
 
     
1 23.1 –0.18 882 –0.01 203 –0.27 
2–9 46.0 –1.35 1604 0.01 737 –1.34 
10 56.1 –1.98 1923 0.01 1079 –1.97 
Total tax revenue      0.28 
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Table 5. Aggregate elasticities of labor supply with respect to a wage increase in the private 
sector. Married Norwegian females, 1994 
 Mean working  
sector 
Mean conditional  
expected hours 
Mean unconditional  
expected hours 
 Probability  
per cent Elasticities Hours  Elasticities Hours  Elasticities 
All (Private and Public) 91.7 0.07 1559 0.10 1455 0.18 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
 
     
1 56.8 0.04 911 0.02 517 0.06 
2–9 95.5 0.07 1600 0.08 1527 0.15 
10 96.5 0.11 1877 0.25 1812 0.37 
Public 47.0 –1.36 1551 0.01 737 –1.42 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
   
   
1 33.7 –0.08 931 –0.00 314 –0.08 
2–9 49.5 –1.32 1596 0.00 790 –1.32 
10 40.4 –2.82 1812 0.03 733 –2.80 
Private 44.7 1.58 1563 0.14 718 1.80 
Deciles of Disp. Income: 
 
     
1 23.1 0.21 882 0.06 203 0.26 
2–9 46.0 1.57 1604 0.14 737 1.73 
10 56.1 2.22 1923 0.24 1079 2.52 
Total tax revenue      0.49 
 
8. The impact on labor supply of constraints on offered hours 
In the model, { }( )j jg hθ  represents the choice restrictions of available jobs at different hours. As 
discussed above, the density of offered hours have two peaks, relating to part-time hours of work and 
full-time hours of work. The alternative, which is that offered hours are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed, corresponds to the standard assumption in neoclassical labor supply models. To illustrate 
the role of this latter assumption, we have used the model to simulate the impact on labor supply of 
replacing our opportunity density, with spikes at part-time and full-time hours, by uniformly 
distributed offered hours. To do so, we have adjusted the coefficients in the indicator for job 
availability in the two sectors so that the total number of available jobs remains constant. How this is 
done is set out in Appendix C.3. 
 The impact on the choice probabilities is not shown here, but it is negligible. The probability of 
not working is 0.083 when hours are constrained and 0.086 when offered hours are uniform. The 
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impact on the choice probabilities of working in the public and private sectors, respectively, is of the 
same negligible order of magnitude. 
 Of greater interest is the impact on hours worked (Table 6) and wage elasticities (Table 7). 
Table 6 shows that replacing the current constraints on offered hours with uniformly distributed hours 
has a negative effect on annual hours supplied, conditional on working, and more so in the public 
sector than in the private. The reduction in overall labor supply, conditional on working, amounts to 
5.5 per cent. 
 Because the spikes play a more important role in the public than in the private sector, we would 
expect that labor supply is more affected in the public sector than in the private sector when the 
constraint on hours is removed. Removing the constraint on offered hours makes it more likely that a 
woman will find jobs with fewer than full-time hours, in particular when working in the public sector. 
It depends on preferences and on the nonlabor income, whether labor supply will increase or decrease. 
However, for many women, say those with children and with a husband in a full-time job, fewer hours 
than implied by a full-time job may be preferred. Our simulation results confirm this conjecture. The 
expected labor supply declines by 8.8 per cent in the public sector and by 2 per cent in the private 
sector. Thus, it seems that the constraints on offered hours in the Norwegian welfare state force the 
married women to work longer hours, in particular in the public sector and in the lowest deciles in the 
distribution of household incomes. 
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Table 6. Mean expected annual hours, conditional on working. Married women, Norway, 
1994. Constrained hours versus uniform hours when the amount of available jobs is 
kept the same 
Categories Constrained offered hours Uniform offered hours 
Working in any sector 
All 1559 1474 
1 decile*   911   808 
2–9 deciles 1600 1506 
10 deciles 1877 1888 
Working in the public sector 
All 1551 1415 
1 decile   931   813 
2–9 deciles 1596 1447 
10 deciles 1812 1757 
Working in the private sector 
All 1563 1532 
1 decile   882   799 
2–9 deciles 1604 1569 
10 deciles 1923 1923 
*Decile(s) refers to the deciles in the distribution of disposable household income, 1994. 
 
 Table 7 gives the wage elasticities, conditional on working, and we see that with uniformly 
distributed offered hours, labor supply becomes more responsive, in particular among those working 
in the public sector and in the lowest deciles. The reason is that with fewer constraints on choices, 
labor supply becomes more responsive. 
25 
Table 7. Aggregate elasticities of labor supply with respect to an overall wage 
Categories Constrained offered hours Uniform offered hours 
Working in any sector 
All 0.19 0.44 
1 decile* 0.07 0.44 
2–9 deciles 0.19 0.44 
10 deciles 0.28 0.44 
Working in the public sector 
All 0.23 0.53 
1 decile 0.14 0.54 
2–9 deciles 0.22 0.53 
10 deciles 0.30 0.54 
Working in the private sector 
All 0.15 0.42 
1 decile –0.04 0.42 
2–9 deciles 0.15 0.42 
10 deciles 0.26 0.45 
*Decile(s) refers to the deciles in the distribution of disposable household income, 1994. 
9. Labor-supply effects of tax reforms 
In 1992, the Norwegian tax system was reformed, with a move towards lower and less progressive tax 
rates. In subsequent years, the tax structure remained virtually unchanged. Therefore, to assess the 
effects on labor supply we have chosen to focus on 1991, the year prior to the tax reform, and a 
postreform year, 1994. 
 The tax rates on labor incomes in these years are set out in Appendix B, and we observe that the 
1992 reform considerably reduced the top marginal tax rate from 0.654 to 0.495. To assess the labor 
supply responses to this reform, we have employed our model to simulate the labor supply among 
married women. Because the 1992 reform was a move towards less progressive taxes, we have also 
used the model to simulate the impact on labor supply of replacing the 1994 tax system with a flat and 
revenue-neutral tax system. The results are reported in Table 8. Note that when taxes are changed, this 
also implies a change in the taxation of the wage income of the spouse.3 
                                                     
3
 To this end we focus only in income taxes paid by the households. We thus suppress the fact that when a tax reform 
changes the decisions of the households and hence their income, indirect taxes like VAT will yield higher revenue to the 
government. 
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 In our model, when the 1991 tax regime is replaced by the 1994 tax regime, we get an increase 
in labor market participation from 88.4 per cent to 91.7 per cent. The increase in participation is 
highest in the lowest deciles in the distribution of disposable household income (in 1994). There is a 
slight reduction in public sector participation, but there is a considerable increase in participation in 
the private sector. Thus, the labor supply effects of the tax reform of 1991 imply that married women 
are given a stronger motive to find work outside home and to work in the private sector. The expected 
hours of work, given participation in any sector, increase by around 250 hours per year, mostly in the 
upper deciles in the distribution of disposable household income; the increase in expected working 
hours is somewhat higher for women working in the private sector. Despite the fact that labor supply 
is stimulated by the reform, tax revenue goes down. The reason is that lower tax rates have a negative 
effect on tax revenue, which outweighs the positive effect on tax revenue from the increase in labor 
supply. 
 Accounting for labor supply responses, a flat tax of 29 per cent on all incomes is found to yield 
the same tax revenue as the 1994 tax system. By introducing a flat tax system, the labor supply 
responses to the 1992 tax reform are reinforced. There is no change in overall participation, but there 
is a further shift in participation away from the public sector towards the private sector. Working hours 
are predicted to increase further, in particular in the upper deciles and in the private sector. However, it 
should be noted that there is also a rather strong increase in supply of labor in the lowest deciles. 
 In Table 9, we report how choice probabilities vary with socioeconomic characteristics. We note 
that the flat tax system reinforces the labor supply effects of the 1992 tax reform. 
 Table 10 reports the mean of expected hours, conditional on working in the public or the private 
sector, and grouped according to socioeconomic characteristics. The most notable result is the large 
increase in hours worked in the private sector by women with the highest education level in response 
to the tax reforms. 
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Table 8. Labor supply responses to the tax reform of 1992 and to a flat tax of 0.29 
 Mean working 
probabilities, per cent 
Mean conditional 
expected annual hours 
Mean unconditional 
expected annual hours 
 1991 1994 Flat 
tax 
1991 1994 Flat 
tax 
1991 1994 Flat 
tax 
All sectors 
(Public and 
private) 
88.4 91.7 91.9 1427 1559 1679 1291 1455 1566 
In deciles:   
1 44.0 56.8 61.1 833 911 981 366 517 600 
2–9 93.1 95.5 95.6 1462 1600 1718 1361 1527 1643 
10 95.2 96.5 92.9 1742 1877 2062 1657 1812 1916 
Public sector 47.5 47.0 44.4 1472 1551 1647 700 737 731 
In deciles:   
1 27.1 33.7 35.3 860 931 1000 233 314 353 
2–9 50.2 49.5 48.3 1484 1596 1686 745 790 797 
10 47.2 40.4 30.7 1733 1812 1936 819 733 594 
Private sector 40.7 44.7 47.4 1444 1563 1754 588 718 831 
In deciles:  
1 16.9 23.1 25.9 789 882 955 133 203 247 
2–9 42.9 46.0 48.3 1436 1604 1750 616 737 846 
10 47.9 56.1 62.2 1750 1923 2125 839 1079 1322 
Tax revenue,  
Mill 1994 
NOK 
      
130 113 113 
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Table 9. Choice probabilities and their variation with socioeconomic variables. Per cent 
1991 tax system 1994 tax system Flat tax of 29% 
Variable Not 
working 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Not 
working 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Not 
working 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Age range                
25–34 14.43 47.56 38.01 10.45 47.32 42.23 10.12 45.06 44.82 
35–44 11.19 49.71 39.10 7.75 49.05 43.20 7.24 46.32 46.43 
43–64 9.90 45.27 44.83 6.80 44.71 48.49 7.44 41.79 50.77 
Number of 
children          
0 7.31 47.27 45.42 4.89 46.02 49.09 5.55 42.92 51.53 
1 9.11 50.03 40.86 6.18 48.88 44.94 5.39 46.42 48.20 
2 14.39 46.62 38.99 10.09 46.76 43.15 9.71 44.39 45.90 
more than 2  22.37 45.71 31.92 16.79 47.03 36.18 16.75 44.67 38.57 
Woman’s 
education          
low ( 9 
years) 13.37 26.54 60.09 9.71 27.54 62.74 8.90 27.48 63.62 
Intermediate  
(10–13 
years) 
12.82 43.46 43.72 9.05 43.42 47.52 9.24 41.19 49.57 
High (15–
17 years) 6.84 76.41 16.75 4.42 73.27 22.31 3.98 67.37 28.65 
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Table 10. Conditional expected annual hours under different tax rate systems by several 
variables and ranges 
1991 tax system 1994 tax system Flat tax of 29% 
Variable Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Age range          
25–34 1465 1434 1530 1576 1589 1706 
35–44 1470 1462 1571 1631 1656 1785 
43–64 1481 1438 1598 1608 1695 1764 
Number of children       
0 1587 1528 1689 1694 1775 1843 
1 1533 1496 1627 1662 1699 1806 
2 1393 1369 1490 1530 1569 1677 
more than 2  1215 1215 1310 1363 1399 1523 
Woman’s education       
low ( 9 years) 1455 1406 1535 1531 1605 1642 
Intermediate  
(10–13 years) 1464 1446 1552 1604 1628 1747 
High (15–17 years) 1494 1531 1607 1768 1702 1968 
 
10. Compensating variation 
To further evaluate the 1992 tax reform, we calculate the change in household welfare. To do so, we 
employ a recent method developed by Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) to calculate Compensating 
Variation (CV). The calculation of CV is not straightforward in a random utility model when utility is 
not linear in household income. A random utility function implies that CV is also random. What we do 
is to calculate the expected value of CV for each individual and thereafter we calculate the population 
density of the individual mean CV and the mean CV within selected deciles. 
 We define 
(17) ( ) ( )( )( ), , , max , , ,jj j jz B hV h W I f U f hW I h z∈= . 
( ), , ,j jV h W I f  denotes the conditional indirect utility, given hours of work h in sector j, with wage 
rate Wj, nonlabor income I and tax system f. From (2) and (3), we have that 
(18) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , max ( )jj j j jz B hV h W I f h W I zψ ε∈= . 
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Owing to the fact that the random taste shifters are extreme value distributed, it follows that we can 
write 
(19) 
( )
max ( ) ( ) ( )
j
j j j j
z B h
d
z g h hε θ ε
∈
=  , 
where d=  denotes equality in distribution and ( )j hε  has c.d.f. ( )exp 1 , 0x x− > . Moreover, ( )j hε , 
0,1,2j = , 0,1,...h = , are independent. (Recall that we use the convention that 0h =  implies 0j = .) 
For the reader’s convenience, we provide a proof of this in Appendix C. As a result, we can express 
the conditional indirect utility as 
(20) ( ) ( ), , , , , ( ) ( )j j j j j jV h W I f h W I g h hψ θ ε=  
for 0h > , 1,2,j =  and 
(21) ( ) ( ) ( )0 0 00, , , 0,0, , 0,0, (0)jV W I f V I f Iψ ε≡ =   
for 0h = . For notational simplicity, let ( ) ( ), , , , ( )j j j j jV h W I h W I g hψ θ=  for 0h >  and 
( ) ( ) ( )0 00, , , 0,0, , 0,0,jV W I f V I f Iψ≡ = . 
 Let ( ), ,V W I f  be the unconditional indirect utility, defined as 
(22) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1,2 0,, , max 0,0, , ,max max , , ,j h h D j jV W I f V I f V h W I f= > ∈ =     . 
The compensating variation CV (for an individual), is defined implicitly through 
(23) ( ) ( )0 1, , , ,V W I f V W I CV f= −  , 
where f0 denotes the initial budget constraint and f1 denotes the budget constraint after the tax reform. 
In Dagsvik and Karlström (2005), it is demonstrated that the distribution of Y I CV≡ −  is given by 
(24) ( )
( ) ( )0, , , ,
( )
j j j
j h D
R h y V h W I f
P Y y
K y
∈> =
∑ ∑
, 
where 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )1 01 if , , , , , ,,
0 otherwise,
j j j j
j
V h W y f V h W I f
R h y
 <
= 
 
and 
(25) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )20 1 0 1
1 0
( ) max 0,0, , , 0,0, , max , , , , , , ,j j j j
j h
K y I f y f V h W I f V h W y fψ ψ
= >
= +∑ ∑ . 
The difference between the case considered here and the treatment in Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) is 
that, in their case, Y is positive whereas in the present case, Y can attain negative values. As a result, 
we cannot use Lemma 1 in Dagsvik and Karlström (2005) to compute the mean. Instead, we use the 
following. 
 Suppose Y is distributed on [ ), , 0a a− ∞ > , with c.d.f. ( )F y . Then 
(26) ( )1 ( )
a
EY F y dy a
∞
−
= − −∫ . 
The proof of (26) is straightforward. From (24), (25) and (26) it follows that the individual mean CV, 
conditional on wage rates, nonlabor income and other characteristics (suppressed in the notation 
below) is given by 
(27) [ ] ( ) ( )2 0 1
1 0
( ) (0)
| , , , , 0,0, ,( ) ( )
j
j j
j h
y h y
a a
dy dyE CV W I I EY I a V h W I f I f
K y K y
ψ
= >
− −
= − = + − −∑ ∑ ∫ ∫  
where yj(h) and y(0) are defined by 
(28) ( ) ( )0 1, , , , , ( ),j j j j jV h W I f V h W y h f= , 
(29) ( ) ( )0 10,0, , 0,0, (0),V I f V y f= . 
It is important to emphasize that the formula in (27) gives the mean CV conditional on wage rates, 
nonlabor income and other individual (observed) characteristics. The next step is to compute the 
conditional mean CV given nonlabor income, education and the demographic variables that enter the 
model, i.e., the mean is taken with respect to the wage rates. This is done by drawing independent 
error terms from the standard normal distribution and thereafter inserting these error terms into the 
wage equations. This yields a set of random wage rates for each woman. From these simulated wage 
rates, one can compute (simulate) the conditional mean, ( )|E CV I  given nonlabor income and other 
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individual characteristics, by taking the expectation with respect to the wage rates distribution for each 
woman. Below, we report the mean and spread in the population. 
 
Table 11. Expected value of compensating variation, an estimate of the welfare changes for 
households from the 1992 tax reform. NOK 1994, with the 1991 tax system used as a 
reference against the 1994 tax system 
 E(CV) 
All 27078  
Deciles in the distribution of household disposable income, 1991: 
1 (poor) 3338  
2–9 (middle) 23727  
10 (rich) 68509  
 
From Table 11, we observe that the mean household in the sample gained NOK 27078 from the 1992 
tax reform. The richest household gained almost 20 times more than the poorest. The distribution of 
expected gain across households is given in Figure 1, and we observe that most of the households will 
benefit from the 1992 tax reform. Thus, such a reform would have attained support from a clear 
majority at an election, as happened in reality in Norway. 
 
Figure 1. Population density of expected Compensating Variation. Distribution of E(CV), 
comparing the 1991 tax regime against the 1994 tax regime 
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 We have also calculated the expected value of compensating variation of a flat tax reform. In 
the calculations, the tax-revenue-neutral flat tax reform of 29% is used as a reference. Negative values 
mean that these values have to be subtracted from household incomes under the flat tax regime in 
order to make the households indifferent in welfare terms between the 1994 regime and the flat tax 
regime. Table 12 then says that, on average, the households will gain NOK 51528 if there is a shift 
from the 1994 tax regime to a flat tax regime. The richest households gain around 11 times more than 
the poorest. Thus, in a distributional sense, the richest household benefited more from having the 1991 
regime replaced with the 1994 tax regime than they would have in the case of a shift from the 1994 tax 
regime to a flat tax regime. In Figure 2, we show the population density of the individual mean CV. 
We observe that a vast majority will benefit from the replacement of the 1994 tax regime with a flat 
tax regime. 
 
Table 12. Expected value of compensating variation, an estimate of the welfare changes for 
households from a flat tax reform. NOK 1994, with a flat tax regime used as a 
reference against the 1994 tax regime 
 E(CV) 
All 
–51437  
Deciles in the distribution of household disposable income, flat tax: 
1 (poor) –17155  
2–9 (middle) –53093  
10 (rich) –146966  
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Figure 2. Population density of expected Compensating Variation. Distribution of E(CV), with 
the flat tax system of 29% used as a reference against the 1994 tax regime 
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11. Conclusions 
A female labor supply model, estimated on Norwegian data from 1994, has been used in selected 
simulation experiments. Some of these experiments illustrate the effect of changes in wage rates, 
whereas others illustrate the effect of a tax reform. The overall elasticities are rather small, but these 
small elasticities shadow for much stronger sectoral responses. 
 We find that a wage increase, overall and by sectors, has a strong positive impact on sector 
choice probabilities. A wage increase gives women an incentive to shift their labor supply from the 
public to the private sector. This is particularly true for women belonging to the highest deciles in the 
distribution of disposable household income. This pattern occurs despite the fact that education and 
experience yield slightly higher returns in the public than in the private sector. The reasons for our 
results are that the wage rate levels and dispersion are higher in the private than in the public sector. 
Moreover, offered hours of work are less regulated in the private sector compared to in the public 
sector. 
 The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 implied a considerable reduction in the top marginal tax rate, 
but the tax rates in lower brackets were also reduced. We find that the impact on overall labor supply 
is rather modest, but again these modest changes shadow for stronger sectoral changes. The tax reform 
stimulated the women to shift their labor from the public to the private sector and to work longer 
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hours. The latter was particularly true for women belonging to the upper deciles in the income 
distribution and working in the private sector. Despite the fact that labor supply was stimulated, the tax 
reform implied a reduction in tax revenue. Thus, the lower tax rates implied lower tax revenues when 
labor supply responses were taken into account. A calculation of the expected value of changes in 
household welfare demonstrated that the richest households benefited far more from the tax reform 
than the poorest household. 
 A flat tax reform, with the same tax revenue as in 1994, would reinforce the labor supply 
responses of the 1992 reform. In relative terms, the richest households benefit more from the 1992 tax 
reform than from a having a further reform towards a flat tax regime. 
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Appendix A 
Description of variables and summary statistics 
 
Table A.1. Description of the variables used in the analysis (values in NOK, 1994) 
Symbols Description 
FNR Identification number  
FAR Woman’s year of birth 
B02 Number of children, 0–2 years 
B36 Number of children, 3–6 years 
B717 Number of children, 7–17 years 
B06 Number of children, 0–6 years 
MALDER Age in years (man) 
MUTD Education in years (man) 
KALDER Age in years (woman) 
KUTD Education in years (woman) 
INR Choice variable of working hours: 1–15 
ARBTID Annual hours of work as follows: 
 INR = 1; ARBTID = 0 
 Public sector Private sector 
KAPINNT Household capital income  
MANNLONN Men’s wage income per year 
Variable generated: 
KUTD_100 Woman’s education in years (KUTD) /100 
SKILL Work experience = woman’s age – woman’s education in years 
(KUTD) – six (starting school age)  
SK_100 SKILL/100 
SK2_100 (SKILL/100)2  
CAPINC Net capital income (CAPINC) = KAPINNT–CHALL as KAPINNT 
includes CHALL.  
CHALL refers to child allowances; see Appendix B 
W_PU Women’s hourly wage in the public sector  
W_PR Women’s hourly wage in the private sector  
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Table A.2. Descriptive statistics, number of observations = 810 
Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
FAR 53.92 9.04 30.00 69.00 
B02 0.23 0.45 0.00 2.00 
B36 0.30 0.56 0.00 3.00 
B717 0.66 0.85 0.00 4.00 
MALDER 42.80 9.17 25.00 66.00 
MUTD 12.05 2.49 9.00 19.00 
KALDER 40.07 9.04 25.00 64.00 
LNKALDER 3.66 0.22 3.22 4.16 
KUTD 11.61 2.15 9.00 17.00 
INR 7.83 4.01 1.00 15.00 
B06 0.54 0.77 0.00 3.00 
ARBTID 1482.89 664.97 0.00 2600.00 
SEKTOR 1.34 0.61 0.00 2.00 
KUTD_100 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.17 
SKILL 22.45 9.63 2.00 49.00 
SK_100 0.22 0.09 0.02 0.49 
SK2_100 0.05 0.04 0.0004 0.24 
KAPINNT 32306.71 42378.48 0.00 568403.00 
CHALL 13094.37 12154.01 0.00 60084.00 
KVLONN 149751.97 83060.53 0.00 581693.00 
MANNLONN 274372.89 106239.67 17312.00 1184861.00 
W_PU 89.36 12.09 64.88 132.34 
W_PR 109.77 13.68 80.14 156.44 
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Appendix B 
Tax functions and child allowances 
Table B.1. Tax function in 1994 for a married nonworking woman whose husband is working, 
OK 1994 
Mannlonn, Ymale Tax T 
0–41907 0 
41907–140500 0.302Ymale–12656 
140500–252000 0.358Ymale–20524 
252000–263000 0.453Ymale–44464 
263000– 0.495Ymale–55510 
 
Table B.2. Tax function in 1994 for a married working woman or man, NOK 1994 
Wage income, Y Tax T 
0–20954 0 
20954–140500 0.302Y–6328 
140500–208000 0.358Y–14196 
208000–236500 0.453Y–33956 
236500– 0.495Y–43889 
 
In 1994, the child allowances were: 
• One child between 0 and 17 years: NOK 10416 
• Two children between 0 and 17 years: NOK 21336 
• Three children between 0 and 17 years: NOK 33696 
• Four children between 0 and 17 years: NOK 46692 
• Five children or more between 0 and 17 years: NOK 60084 
 
Table B.3. Tax function in 1991 for a married nonworking woman, whose husband is working, 
NOK 1994 
Mannlonn, Ymale Tax T 
0–38392 0 
38392–70746 0.303Ymale–11642 
70746–171915 0.343Ymale–14455 
171915–200567 0.418Ymale–27348 
200567–264239 0.558Ymale–55428 
264239– 0.654Ymale–80509 
41 
Table B.4. Tax function in 1991 for a married working woman, or working man. NOK 1994 
Wage income Y Tax T 
0–19596 0 
19596–22639 0.343Y–6722 
22639–70746 0.303Y–5832 
70746–137956 0.343Y–8634 
137956–174037 0.418Y–18981 
174037–219669 0.558Y–42964 
219669– 0.654Y–64214 
42 
Appendix C 
C.1 The wage equations 
Wage equations accounting for heterogeneity, with ηj denoting the random effect are 
 ( )* 1 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 1exp log= = + + + +ji ji i j j i j i j i j jiW w Z Z Zη α α α α σ η , 
for sector 1,2j = , where , 1,2,3,kiZ k =  are respectively, the woman’s experience (divided by 100), 
the square of the previous variable, and woman’s education in years (divided by 100), and ηj the 
random effect on wages. 
 
Table C.1 Estimates of wage equations. Norwegian women, 1994 
Public sector Private sector 
Variables 
Estimates t-values Estimates t-values 
Constant  3.37 13.5  3.70 25.2 
Experience in years/100  3.21  6.0  2.55  5.1 
(Experience in years/100)2 –4.75 –5.3 –3.80 –4.2 
Education in years/100  5.57  4.9  5.26  4.2 
Log (Probability of working in 
the chosen sector) –0.12 –2.0  0.06  0.9 
Variances 0.059 18.6 0.075 17.0 
No of observations 691 580 
R2 0.14 0.08 
 
The Box–Cox type of specification for the deterministic part of the utility function is given by 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
31
31
4
00 2
2 4 5 6 7 8
1 3
4
0 0
9
1 3
1[10 ( )] 1log ( , ) log (log ) 6 6
[ ]10 1 1
L LC C
v C h A A CU CO
C C L L
αα
αα
α α α α α α
α α
α
α α
−
−
   − −
− −  = +  + + + +    
  
− − − − +      
 
where A is the age of the married woman, CU6 and CO6 are the number of children less than six years 
and above six years, L is leisure, defined as 
 0 1 3640,L L h− = −  
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and , 1,2,...,9=j jα , are unknown parameters. Observe that from total annual hours we have 
subtracted a “subsistence” level, L0, amounting to 5120 hours, which corresponds to about 14 hours 
per day reserved for sleep and rest, and similarly a subsistence level, C0, for consumption chosen to be 
close to the official estimate of a subsistence level in Norway (NOK 60 000). Total consumption C is 
measured as the sum of the annual wage income of the woman and her husband after tax, household 
capital income after tax and child allowances. If 1 3 21, 1, 0,< < >α α α  
 ( )24 5 6 7 8log log 6 6 0A A CU COα α α α α+ + + + > , 
and α9 is positive, or if negative, sufficiently small numerically, then log ( ),v C h  is increasing in C, 
decreasing in (h) for fixed C and strictly concave in ( ),C h . 
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C.2. Estimates of the labor supply model 
Table C.2. Estimation results for the parameters of the labor supply probabilities 
Uniformly distributed offered hours, but with part-
time and full-time peaks Variables 
Parameters Estimates  t-values  
Preferences:  
Consumption:    
Exponent α1 0.64  7.6  
Scale 10–4 α2 1.77  4.2  
Subsistence level C0 in NOK per year  60 000   
Leisure: 
 
  
Exponent α3 –0.53  –2.1  
Constant α4 115.02  3.2  
Log age α5 –63.61  –3.2  
(log age)2 α6 9.20  3.3  
# children 0–6 years α7 1.27  4.0  
# children 7–17 years α8 0.97  4.1  
Consumption and Leisure, interaction α9 –0.12  –2.7  
Subsistence level of leisure in hours per year 
 
5120   
The parameters θ1 and θ2; θ +j j1 j2log f f S= *  
Constant, public sector (sector 1) f11 –4.20 –4.7 
Constant, private sector (sector 2) f21  1.14  1.0 
Education, public sector (sector 1) f12  0.22  2.9 
Education, private sector (sector 2) f22 –0.34 –3.3 
Opportunity density of offered hours, gj(h), j = 1, 2  
Full-time peak, public sector (sector 1)** ( ) ( )( )1 Full 1 0log g h g h  1.58 11.8 
Full-time peak, private sector (sector 2) ( ) ( )( )2 Full 2 0log g h g h  1.06  7.4 
Part-time peak, public sector ( ) ( )( )1 Part 1 0log g h g h  0.68  4.4 
Part-time peak, private sector ( ) ( )( )2 Part 2 0log g h g h  0.80  5.2 
# observations  810 
Log likelihood  –1760.9 
*
 The estimates of fj1 are not “correct” as we have not normalized the gj(h) functions to be probability 
density functions. However, in the simulation experiments, we have used a normalized version. 
**
 The notation h0 refers to an arbitrary level of hours of work different from typical full-time and part-
time hours. 
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C.3. Adjustment of coefficients, constraint on hours versus no constraints 
Let *1jf  denote the adjusted constant for sector j in equation (8) above and let *jθ  denote the 
corresponding new value for θj. Let γjF and γjP denote the parameters associated with full-time and 
part-time hours in sector j. It can be shown that the new values of bj and fj1 are given by 
 
* *
1 2log j j jf f Sθ = +  
and 
 
( ) ( )
*
1 1
5 exp exp
log
7
jF jP
j jf f
γ γ + + = +   
 
for 1,2j = . Note that we have seven categories of hours, of which two are part-time and full-time 
workloads. With the estimates in Table 1 ( 1 1.58Fγ = , 1 0.68Pγ = , 2 1.06Fγ = , 2 0.8Pγ = , 11 4.20f = −  
and 21 1.14f = ) we find that the new constants have to increase to –3.68 ( *11f= , sector 1, the public 
sector) and to 1.51 ( *21f= , sector 2, the private sector). Because more jobs are concentrated around 
full-time hours in the public sector than in the private sector, the increase in the θj for the public sector 
has to be the larger. 
 
A proof of eq. (19) 
Consider the distribution of the second factor on the right-hand side of (21). As ( ), 0,1,2,...,j z zε =  are 
i.i.d. with c.d.f. ( )exp 1 x− , it follows that 
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
max ( ) ( ) exp exp
j jj j
j j
z B h
z B hz B h z B h
P z x P z x
x x
ε ε
∈
∈∈ ∈
     ≤ = ≤ = − = −                ∑∏∩ . 
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